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Owning a home is often referred to as the quintessential American 
dream; however, for many Americans this dream may be coming to an 
end. In the coming years, approximately five million homeowners will 
go through the frightening and confusing process of foreclosure.
1
 Since 
2008, nearly four million homeowners have already been through this 
horrifying experience, with some unjustly losing their homes.
2
 There is 
hope for the future. Changes in laws and regulations may help to 
alleviate the foreclosure process, and these changes may enable many 
Americans to keep the dream alive. 
The foreclosure process has changed drastically over the years. 
Some scholars conclude that the older procedures and standards for 
conducting a foreclosure were more efficient, clear, and treated both 
parties fairly; however, the modern foreclosure proceedings, varying by 
state, are complicated and plagued with fraud, partly because of the 
increase in popularity of the secondary mortgage market.
3
 In recent 
years, unidentifiable entities filing foreclosure complaints were blamed 
for causing many of the foreclosure confusion today. One company in 
particular, Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS), 
once claimed to have title to nearly half of the mortgages being filed 
today.
4
 However, oftentimes the homeowner has not entered into a 
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support during the writing of this article. Finally, the author wishes to thank Rachel Nader, Esq. and 
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 1.  Nestor M. Davidson, New Formalism in the Aftermath of the Housing Crisis, 93 B.U. L. 
REV. 389, 399 (2013) (stating that during this current economic crisis, nearly 1.5 million 
foreclosures are being filed every year); see also Jonathan Stempel, Top Massachusetts Court Limits 
Foreclosure Relief, REUTERS (June 22, 2012, 4:15 PM), http://www.reuters.com/
article/2012/06/22/us-massachusetts-foreclosures-idUSBRE85L18I20120622 (providing more in-
depth foreclosure statistics). 
 2.  Davidson, supra note 1, at 391. 
 3.  Id. at 413. 
 4.  Laura A. Steven, Note, MERS and the Mortgage Crisis: Obfuscating Loan Ownership 
and the Need for Clarity, 7 BROOK. J. CORP. FIN. & COM. L. 251, 251 (2012); see also Michael 
Powell & Gretchen Morgenson, MERS? It May Have Swallowed Your Loan, N.Y. TIMES (Mar. 5, 
2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/03/06/business/06mers.html7  
ref=mortgageelectronicregistrationsystemsinc (providing statistics on the number of transactions in 
which MERS has become involved). 
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mortgage agreement with these unidentifiable entities.
5
 
Many predicted this confusion during the early years of the crisis.
6
 
Therefore, to combat the flawed process, some states started taking a 
proactive approach by streamlining the system and increasing the 
requirements for the mortgagee, while also providing defenses to the 
mortgagors.
7
 However, too few states have made the proper changes to 
the foreclosure proceeding process. With the hopes of keeping 
homeowners from unjustly losing their homes, now is the time for states 
that have yet to adapt to provide the needed solutions required to handle 
the procedural problems.
8
 
The primary purpose for this comment is to provide an overview of 
the foreclosure process while introducing the laws and regulations that 
would govern an “ideal” foreclosure system. First, it provides a general 
introduction to the mortgage/foreclosure process. This introduction is 
crucial; it will help many to understand the way financial institutions 
have complicated the foreclosure process. Next, it analyzes various 
states, labeling them as either having “strict” foreclosure laws and 
regulations or having “lenient” foreclosure laws and regulations. Lastly, 
this comment discusses the pros and cons of various foreclosure 
requirements. The ultimate goal of this comment is to establish a set of 
standards that states and courts should implement in order to provide for 
a fair, efficient, and comprehensive foreclosure process. Ultimately, this 
comment advocates for less stringent standing requirements, more court 
involvement in the foreclosure process, and mandatory mediation. 
I. THE FORECLOSURE CRISIS IN AMERICA 
Before the advent of the current mortgage financing system, 
homeowners enjoyed a personal relationship with their banks. The 
banks, as lenders, personally managed the loan, the record keeping, and 
the collection of payments.
9
 This relationship afforded a more defined 
and efficient foreclosure process, since the original bank that financed 
the home was also the bank that brought the foreclosure action.
10
 
 
 5.  Elizabeth Renuart, Property Title Trouble in Non-Judicial Foreclosure States: the Ibanez 
Time Bomb?, 4 WM. & MARY BUS. L. REV. 111, 118-19 (2013). 
 6.  Gerald Korngold, Proposed Regulatory Solution: Legal and Policy Choices in the 
Aftermath of the Subprime and Mortgage Financing Crisis, 60 S.C. L. REV. 727, 727 (2009). 
 7.  Davidson, supra note 1, at 399. 
 8.  Id. 
 9.  Lydia Nussbaum, ADR’s Place in Foreclosure: Remedying the Flaws of a Securitized 
Housing Market, 34 CARDOZO L. REV. 1889, 1893 (2013). 
 10.  Id. 
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Furthermore, in the event that a homeowner defaulted on a loan, the 
original bank was more likely, as a result of personal incentives, to 
modify the loan. This modification prevented community blight in the 
towns where the banks operated, which helped the banks maintain a 
positive image in the community.
11
 
Under this former system, if an institution assigned or transferred a 
note or mortgage, a county department kept records of the mortgage 
transfers and assignments, allowing homeowners to easily determine 
which entity owned the debt and had rights to enforce the mortgage.
12
 
However, the downfall of this system began in the 1970s.
13
 
When mortgage securitization and secondary mortgage markets 
became popular in the late 1970s, the mortgage market abandoned the 
traditional model.
14
 The new market developed as the “baby-boomers” 
first began to purchase homes. The dramatic increase in homeownership 
forced financial institutions to realize that many local banks lacked the 
sufficient capital needed to fund the growing demand for home mortgage 
loans.
15
 As a result, investment banks began bundling several mortgages 
together, then issuing securities on these bundles, usually in the form of 
bonds.
16
 These bonds represent the holder’s right “to receive certain 
payments under the mortgages.”17 The security interests are then traded 
as securities on the open market.
18
 Put simply, “securitization is the 
process of utilizing mortgage loans to back investment instruments.”19 
This system, in the beginning, allowed for more capital to finance the 
growing demand for home loans.
20
 Unfortunately, this modern system, 
which enabled more people to purchase homes, was one of the direct 
causes of the current mortgage crisis.
21
 
 
 11.  Id. at 1894 (discussing the ramifications for a bank in the event of default by many 
homeowners). The bank was aware of the monetary consequences to the institution and was also 
aware of the ramifications to the community. Id. 
 12.  See Paul McMorrow, A New Act in Foreclosure Circus, BOSTON GLOBE (Jan. 14, 2011), 
http://www.boston.com/bostonglobe/editorial_opinion/oped/articles/2011/01/14/a_new_act_in_fore
closure_circus/ (describing a system that has been characterized as one in which financial 
institutions buy, sell, and trade mortgages and promissory notes as if they were baseball cards). 
 13.  Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1896. 
 14.  Id.  
 15.  Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1896. 
 16.  Id. 
 17.  Korngold, supra note 6, at 729. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 128. 
 20.  Adam J. Levitin & Susan M. Wachter, Explaining the Housing Bubble, 100 GEO. L.J. 
1177, 1210 (2012). 
 21.  Id. 
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A. The Foreclosure Process 
In order to understand the collapse of the housing market and the 
role of the securitization process in contributing to the collapse, it is 
crucial to discuss the operation of the foreclosure process. A foreclosure 
is defined as a “legal proceeding to terminate a mortgagor’s interest in 
property, instituted by the lender. . .either to gain title or to force a sale 
in order to satisfy the unpaid debt secured by the property.”22 
For a majority of the population, in order to purchase a home, one 
must obtain a mortgage loan. A financial institution issues a loan to the 
potential homeowner, along with an accompanying promissory note for 
the loan, and a mortgage document is signed. In the event a homeowner 
is unable to make payments per the terms of the note, a foreclosure 
proceeding may be commenced. 
Essentially, the purpose of a foreclosure is to allow the financial 
institution, a mortgagee, to sell or convey the property in order to 
recover money owed on the debt that was secured by the mortgage; 
basically, the house is used as collateral.
23
 A loan in the form of a 
mortgage typically consists of two documents to secure the principle 
balance given to the future homeowner: a note and a security instrument 
(mortgage).
24
 The note represents the legal obligation of the homeowner 
to repay the money advanced to him or her in order to purchase the 
home.
25
 The mortgage document represents the financial institution’s 
security or collateral in the note; meaning, the mortgage “creates a 
security interest in the borrower’s real property and permits the 
mortgagee or beneficiary to foreclose in the event of non-payment or a 
breach of other duties.”26 
In most cases following the default of the note, the financial 
institutions may require an acceleration of the balance of the note, 
demanding the immediate payment of the remainder still owed under the 
note. Depending on the jurisdiction, the financial institution may be 
required to give notice of the default, usually through a foreclosure 
action, prior to accelerating the balance.
27
 A failure to pay the remaining 
 
 22.  William M. Howard, Annotation, Necessity of Production of Original Note Involved in 
Mortgage Foreclosure—Twenty-First Century Cases, 86 A.L.R. 6th 411, § 2. 
 23.  Id. 
 24.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 131 (citing GRANT S. NELSON & DALE A. WHITMAN, REAL 
ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 5.27 (5th ed. 2007)). 
 25.  Id. 
 26.  Id. (citing RICHARD R. POWELL, POWELL ON REAL PROPERTY § 37.03 (Michael Allan 
Wolfe ed., LexisNexis Matthew Bender 2009)). 
 27.  Howard, supra note 22, § 3. 
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balance on the note may result in the financial institution taking the 
property to pay off the balance: a foreclosure.
28
 Typically, the party 
bringing the initial foreclosure action is the one that owns the debt or 
obligation.
29
 However, some jurisdictions allow uninterested parties, 
such as a nominee mortgagee like MERS, to bring the foreclosure 
action—a concept that is explored in this comment. 
B. The Collapse and the Potential Causes 
During the formative years of the mortgage securitization market, 
the security packages were typically packaged based on a single bank’s 
prime mortgages.
30
 However, as the demand for mortgage-backed 
securities increased over time, the low-risk packages were expanded to 
include not only more banks, but also sub-prime, high-risk mortgages.
31
 
In 2006, after nine years of growth and consistent increases in home 
prices,
32
 this growth rapidly declined.
33
 From 1997 to 2001, housing 
appreciations stayed relatively steady at 6%.
34
 However, from 2001 to 
2005, there was an enormous increase in appreciation rates, and by 2005, 
the rates had increased beyond 12%.
35
 In 2007, the rates fell below zero, 
the burst of the bubble.
36
 
The theories and explanations behind this collapse are plentiful.
37
 
Given this lack of consensus, a few of the more prominent theories shall 
be noted. First, one of the more popular theories blames the increase in 
demand for home ownership on the consistent increase in home prices 
and the decrease in interest rates.
38
 As a second theory, some were quick 
to blame the Community Reinvestment Act, which was passed in 1977.
39
 
 
 28.  Id. 
 29.  Id. § 2. 
 30.  Korngold, supra note 6, at 730 (citing Brooke Masters & Saskia Scholtes, Payback Time, 
FIN. TIMES (Aug. 9, 2007, 3:00 AM), http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/1f7200ca-4611-11dc-b359-
0000779fd2ac.html#axzz3LFTMhu2K). 
 31.  Id. 
 32.  Davidson, supra note 1, at 397 (citing ROBERT J. SHILLER, THE SUBPRIME SOLUTION: 
HOW TODAY’S GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS HAPPENED, AND WHAT TO DO ABOUT IT 32 (1st ed. 
2008)). 
 33.  Id.at 398. 
 34.  Levitin, supra note 21, at 1210. 
 35.  Id. 
 36.  Id. 
 37.  Id. at 1211-12 (noting that the lack of consensus is attributed to the fact that the 
probability was high for multiple causes of the collapse, and it is unknown if any factor was more 
relevant than others). 
 38.  Id. 
 39.  Id. at 1214. 
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While this act did not directly require financial institutions to give out an 
increased number of loans, the act established a practice whereby 
financial institutions were evaluated based on their ability and 
willingness to serve low to moderate-income borrowers, a higher risk 
group.
40
 As a result, banks had an incentive to provide mortgage loans to 
lower income families. A third theory is that changes to the aims of the 
Affordable Housing Act contributed to the collapse.
41
 These changes 
pushed for more housing options for low-to-moderate income borrowers 
as well as more housing options for underserved areas, while 
encouraging “special-affordable multifamily units.”42 As a fourth theory, 
one particular economist contributes the collapse to the Federal Reserve, 
which allegedly kept the interest rates too low for an unwarranted period 
of time; these low interest rates explain the increase in demand for 
mortgages, as the interest rates allowed for cheaper mortgage credit.
43
 
Fifth, the relaxed standards of both the securitization market and 
foreclosure process may have contributed to the formation of the 
mortgage/housing bubble.
44
 Some of these relaxed standards include 
mispriced risk of mortgage credit and credit applications that did not 
require strict qualification standards, partially as the result of growth of 
the mortgage market due to the expansion of mortgage securitization.
45
 
C. The Mortgage Electronic Registration System (MERS) 
The organization known as Mortgage Electronic Registration 
System (MERS), adds further confusion to an already complicated 
system.
46
 Created in 1993, MERS is a national record system;
47
 
however, even to this day, little is known about this organization or the 
ramifications of its services.
48
 Essentially, MERS acts as a record-keeper 
that maintains a “private registry of mortgages.”49 Member institutions 
that own mortgage loans designate MERS as a nominal mortgagee to a 
 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 1218. 
 42.  Id. at 1219 (citing 12 U.S.C. §§ 4562-4565 (2008)). 
 43.  Id. at 1222 (citing JOHN B. TAYLOR, GETTING OFF TRACK: HOW GOVERNMENT ACTIONS 
AND INTERVENTIONS CAUSED, PRO-LONGED, AND WORSENED THE FINANCIAL CRISIS 4 (2009)). 
 44.  Id. at 1226. 
 45.  Id. at 1226-28. 
 46.  Steven, supra note 4, at 251; see also Christopher L. Peterson, Foreclosure, Subprime 
Mortgage Lending, and The Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 78 U. CIN. L. REV. 1359, 
1378 (2010). 
 47.  Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 770 N.W.2d 487, 490 (Minn. 2009). 
 48.  Peterson, supra note 46, at 1361. 
 49.  Davidson, supra note 1, at 401. 
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specific loan; “MERS does not originate, lend, service, or invest in home 
mortgage loans.”50 It acts as a recording system that allows its members 
to transfer and assign mortgage loans “without having to record each 
transfer in the local land recording offices where the real estate securing 
the mortgage is located.”51 This recording displays MERS as the 
mortgagee, as opposed to the actual lending institute.
52
 The member 
organizations allow MERS to record the transfers and assignments in 
MERS’ system. The purpose is to increase efficiency and profitability 
that occurs in each transfer.
53
 After a member entity registers its 
mortgage transfers, MERS becomes and remains the name on the 
mortgage in the public records.
54
 
Historically, under the traditional recording system, “the originating 
lender made a traditional mortgage loan by listing itself as the payee on 
the promissory note and as the mortgagee on the security instrument”; 
subsequently, “[t]he loan [was] then assigned to a seller for repackaging 
through securitization for the investor[,]” and all transfers [were] 
recorded in local offices.
55
 However, under the current MERS system, 
the original financial institution “pays MERS a fee to record an 
assignment to MERS in the county records.”56 
What incentive do financial institutions have to subscribe to 
MERS’ services? MERS monitors and follows each mortgage 
assignment, which “‘saves lenders time and money, and reduces 
paperwork, by eliminating the need to prepare and record assignments 
when trading loans.”‘57 However, it is important to note that during this 
process MERS never negotiates, enters into, or communicates with the 
mortgagor/homeowner.
58
 Lastly, according to MERS itself, MERS does 
not physically hold any documents for any of its subscribers, including 
the mortgage document and the note.
59
 
Equipped with a background to the mortgage system, the 
 
 50.  Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Peterson, supra note 46, at 1361-62 (discussing how MERS will then remain as the name 
on the loan for the life of the mortgage, even after assignment or transfer to another entity, 
essentially making the securitization process easier). 
 53.  Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490. 
 54.  Davidson, supra note 1, at 401. 
 55.  Peterson, supra note 46, at 1370. 
 56.  Id. 
 57.  Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 490 (quoting MERS). 
 58.  Id. 
 59.  See generally Landmark Nat’l Bank v. Kesler, 216 P.3d 158 (Kan. 2009) (noting that 
MERS is not and does not hold itself out to be the owner or holder of the mortgage documents or 
promissory note documents). 
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foreclosure process, and mortgage servicing entities, one may begin to 
analyze a common foreclosure scenario. 
II. A COMMON FORECLOSURE SCENARIO 
For many Americans, the typical situation resulting in a foreclosure 
process is the same: a default of the home mortgage loan under the terms 
of a note. However, such a simple concept of using a lien on a home to 
repay a promissory note can be filled with many nuisances and 
complications. Foreclosure complaints come with various nuisances 
because of the use of securitized loans and the consistent buying and 
selling of a single mortgage loan. A more simplified explanation of the 
concepts and principles in this comment is found in a typical foreclosure 
fact scenario from a recent Ohio case.
60
 
In 2006, two potential homeowners went to a local bank with the 
intent to purchase a home, by way of a mortgage, and they were able to 
obtain a mortgage worth $251,250 from Legacy Mortgage.
61
 The 
approved homeowners signed, separately, both a promissory note and a 
mortgage, which ultimately granted Legacy Mortgage a security interest 
to the property.
62
 Therefore, the bank and homeowners entered into two 
separate agreements: (1) the promissory note, with both signatures from 
the homeowners and signatures from Legacy Mortgage, and (2) the 
mortgage document, with both signatures from the homeowners and 
signatures from Legacy Mortgage.
63
 
Following the execution of both documents, the homeowners 
obtained the necessary funding to purchase their home.
64
 However, 
subsequent to the signing of the promissory note and mortgage 
document, Legacy Mortgage signed over the promissory note, through 
an endorsement to Wells Fargo.
65
 Unfortunately, like many Americans 
in 2008, hard times fell upon the homeowners.
66
 They contacted Wells 
Fargo after receiving information on the default in payments, and both 
contracting parties, including Wells Fargo, agreed to a short sale in an 
attempt to settle the default with the bank; both parties agreed to a short 
 
 60.  See generally Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St. 3d 13, 2012-
Ohio-5017, 979 N.E.2d 1214. (This is one of the more recent cases that has come out of Ohio, 
decided by the Supreme Court of Ohio, where the Court decided the issue of standing when various 
transfers and assignments took place under the promissory note and mortgage.) 
 61.  Id. at ¶ 5. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. 
 64.  See id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  See id. at ¶ 6. 
9
Meek: Mortgage Foreclosure Proceedings
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
138 AKRON LAW REVIEW [48:129 
 
sale in the amount of $259,900, closing in June 2009.
67
 
About the same time the short sale contract was entered into, to the 
surprise of the homeowners, a company called Federal Home Loan 
Mortgage Corporation (FHLM) filed a complaint against the 
homeowners  and accelerated the cost of the loan, an amount of 
approximately $245,085.18.
68
 However, FHLM did not have a copy of 
the promissory note, nor is there evidence that it was made aware of the 
short sale agreement.
69
 After addressing this confusion with Wells 
Fargo, Wells Fargo assured the homeowners that it was a technicality 
and the short sale would still proceed.
70
 
Despite this reassurance from Wells Fargo, FHLM filed a 
foreclosure complaint in an Ohio court, alleging the homeowners had 
defaulted on the loan and owed $245,085.18, not including the interest, 
court and attorney costs, and advances.
71
 Along with the complaint, 
FHLM attached a copy of the promissory note, which the homeowners 
had originally signed, and FHLM attached a blank endorsement from 
Wells Fargo and included the endorsement from Legacy Mortgage to 
Wells Fargo.
72
 Furthermore, to make matters more confusing, Wells 
Fargo officially assigned both the note and mortgage to FHLM 
approximately 3 weeks after FHLM officially filed the foreclosure 
complaint.
73
 
This example shows just how complicated a foreclosure proceeding 
can become when multiple notes and mortgages are transferred, 
assigned, and endorsed. There are several variations and nuisances that 
surround foreclosure proceedings, and this example is just a simple 
variation to show some of the consequences associated with assignments 
and transfers. 
III. IF IT’S BROKE, FIX IT: PROBLEMS WITH THE FORECLOSURE PROCESS 
As one can see from the discussion above, there are many issues 
concerning the procedures involved in a foreclosure action. To recap, 
some of the problems that may plague a party bringing a foreclosure 
action include: whether the party has possession of one or both of the 
documents associated with a mortgage loan (the note and the 
 
 67.  Id. 
 68.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
 69.  Id. 
 70.  Id.at ¶ 8. 
 71.  Id. at ¶ 7. 
 72.  Id. at ¶ 9. 
 73.  Id. at ¶ 10. 
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security/mortgage document); whether the party has possession of the 
proper assignment listing the true mortgagee and assignee; and whether 
MERS is permitted to bring a foreclosure action in that jurisdiction. 
Unfortunately, many states deal with these issues in very different ways, 
causing confusion and disorganization in the foreclosure process. For 
these reasons, this comment calls for a more uniform approach to deal 
with foreclosures and a change to some of the necessary requirements to 
bring such an action. 
In order to establish which procedural aspects should be re-
formatted, this comment first analyzes the issues that currently 
complicate the foreclosure system. It then analyzes the standards and 
procedures of different states by classifying them into two categories. 
The two categories are strict foreclosure requirements and lenient 
foreclosure requirements, and the classifications are based on the state’s 
level of scrutiny over the institutions that bring the action. 
A. Problems with the Current System 
1. Drawbacks of Securitization 
In recent years, the securitization process, an area of law no less 
complicated than many other areas of transaction law,
74
 has been littered 
with carelessness and fraud.
75
 For example, in California between 2009 
and 2011, 84 % of the transactions involving mortgages resulted in 
documentation violations; 27 % of the documents “suggested that the 
original or prior owner of the mortgage loan may not have signed the 
[assignment or transfer,] and instead it was signed by an employee or 
another entity; 11 percent of the time, the assignee signed as the 
assignor; and, in 6 percent of the files, two or more conflicting 
assignments were recorded, making it impossible for either to be legally 
valid.”76 
During the process of securitization, the note and the mortgage 
documents often become separated, with one institution receiving the 
servicing rights to the loan and the other entity receiving ownership of 
 
 74.  Davidson, supra note 1, at 402. 
 75.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 111; see also Steven, supra note 4, at 257 (citing Floyd Norris, 
Some Sand in the Gears of Securitizing, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 18, 2010), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/10/19/business/19norris.html) (discussing MERS engaging in 
“quasi-fraudulent practices such as robo-signing”). 
 76.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 122 (citing CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO OFFICE OF 
THE ASSESSOR-RECORDER, FORECLOSURE IN CALIFORNIA: A CRISIS OF COMPLIANCE 1, 6-7 
(2012)). 
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the mortgage.
77
 The purpose for this split is to make the packaging of the 
mortgages easier to securitize and trade.
78
 Furthermore, in an attempt to 
make the securitization process more efficient, financial entities 
subscribe to services that participate in acts of “robo-signing.”79 
The concept of robo-signing further exemplifies problems with the 
securitized mortgage market. A robo-signer is a person “who quickly 
signs hundreds or thousands of foreclosure documents in a month, 
despite swearing that he or she has personally reviewed the mortgage 
documents.”80 This essentially causes carelessness in the transfer 
process, whereby the proper documents are not properly signed or 
included in the package being transferred.
81
 The problems associated 
with robo-signing are so prevalent that many states stopped foreclosure 
proceedings in order to investigate potential mistakes and fraud.
82
 
2. Problems Associated with the MERS System 
The MERS recording system can be criticized from many different 
aspects. In fact, some attribute MERS to creating the entire secondary 
mortgage market that eventually collapsed because it reduced, and 
almost eliminated, the transaction costs of assigning or transferring 
ownership in a mortgage.
83
 One criticism is that the MERS system 
creates confusion amongst financial institutions because non-member 
institutions are not aware of transfers between MERS members.
84
 
Furthermore, if non-MERS institutions assign or accept assignments 
from member institutions, the MERS system no longer takes control of 
the assignment or maintains itself as a mortgagee of record.
85
 Another 
 
 77.  Steven, supra note 4, at 254 (citing Beau Phillips, MERS: The Mortgage Electronic 
Registration System, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262, 263 (2009)). 
 78.  Id. 
 79.  For a complete explanation of robo-signing, see Renuart, supra note 5, at 124-26. 
 80.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 125. 
 81.  Id. (analyzing One West Bank, F.S.B. v. Drayton, 910 N.Y.S.2d 857, 859-69 (N.Y. Sup. 
Ct. 2010)); see also Gloria J. Liddell & Pearson Liddell, Jr., The Legal Quagmire of Invalid 
Residential Foreclosure Proceedings and the Resultant Potential Impact upon Stakeholders, 16 
CHAP. L. REV. 367, 384 (2013) (noting that “with this high volume of new loan originators and 8.1 
million potential foreclosures, coupled with tens of millions of unrecorded assignments, it is a small 
wonder that MERS, and mortgage service companies in the name of MERS, had to resort to an 
assembly line process whereby agents of MERS signed affidavits regarding the propriety of 
foreclosure documentation without reviewing the loan file”). 
 82.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 126. 
 83.  Davidson, supra note 1, at 401 (MERS has a role in six out of ten mortgage loans in the 
United States); see also Brett J. Natarelli & James M. Golden, The End of the Beginning in the 
Battle Over MERS, 65 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 400, 401 (2011). 
 84.  Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 770 N.W.2d 487, 491 (Minn. 2009). 
 85.  Id.  
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criticism is that in instances where documentation may be necessary for 
an assignment or transfer, MERS does not draft or handle the 
documentation maintenance of non-MERS members; instead, MERS 
encourages the member financial institutions to have an officer become 
MERS certified, with the authority to sign documents on behalf of 
MERS, allowing the documents to remain in MERS’ name.86 
Another criticism is that MERS assumes the role as a party 
conducting foreclosure.
87
 In these instances courts have to determine 
whether MERS has standing to bring a foreclosure action against a 
homeowner.
88
 The reason for the confusion is three-fold. First, MERS 
does not loan money to the homeowner and no money comes from 
MERS to be applied to the loan principal.
89
 Second, the homeowner 
never promised to pay MERS any money, including payments on the 
note, and MERS is not entitled to collect the monthly payments.
90
 Third, 
MERS does not receive any of the money collected at the conclusion of 
a foreclosure sale; these funds go to the mortgagee that actually owns the 
note.
91
 
Federal courts have established a three-part test to determine 
standing: (1) an injury in fact, (2) causation, and (3) redressability.
92
 
When applying this test to MERS, one can clearly see that it may lack 
standing. MERS has no right to receive payments under the contract, nor 
should it expect to receive payments from the homeowners; in fact, 
MERS “makes the same amount of money with respect to the original 
mortgage agreement whether the borrower repays or not.”93 MERS’ 
label as a “nominal mortgagee” does not provide it with an actual injury, 
thus it may lack standing to bring the foreclosure action; however, some 
states do consider MERS as having standing.
94
 
Under the traditional standing requirements, MERS would not have 
standing to bring a foreclosure action in court. However, given that some 
states allow courts to grant MERS standing, MERS has apparently been 
granted a “pass” on traditional standing requirements. The concern over 
MERS’ ability to sue has diminished over the last few years, however, as 
 
 86.  Id. 
 87.  Peterson, supra note 46, at 1377-78. 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  Id. at 1377. 
 90.  Id. at 1378. 
 91.  Id. 
 92.  Id. at 1381 (analyzing Sprint Commc’ns Co., L.P. v. APCC Servs., Inc., 554 U.S. 269, 
273-74 (2008)). 
 93.  Id. at 1381-82. 
 94.  Id. at 1382. 
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MERS’ has adopted a policy of no longer bringing foreclosure actions.95 
MERS creates more confusion for homeowners by failing to notify 
the mortgagors “when ownership of [the mortgage] changes hands.”96 
Thus, one of the major issues addressed below in terms of state 
classification, is how the state’s rules and regulations govern MERS and 
its ability to notify and bring foreclosure complaints against 
homeowners.
97
 The lack of disclosure to homeowners creates confusion 
when the homeowner goes to her financial institution to re-negotiate a 
loan or to enforce a legal right and is unable to learn the true identity of 
the title holder.
98
 
Furthermore, as a result of MERS’ involvement with the splitting of 
mortgage documents, multiple owners have interests in a homeowner’s 
property; therefore, “it may be unclear who has the authority to modify 
the instrument and arrive at a workout of a troubled loan with the 
borrower.”99 Essentially, the public records for assignments are no 
longer updated to contain the most current information a homeowner 
may need when determining who has an interest in the note or mortgage. 
In fact, if MERS is expanded to encompass all financial organizations, 
local record departments that manage assignments will be rendered 
useless.
100
 
Despite the potential negative consequences of mortgagee 
nominees, such as MERS, financial institutions have two incentives to 
utilize their services. First, the services make the initial recordings and 
subsequent assignment transfers easier to record in the county offices,
101
 
allowing the institutions to lower recording costs.
102
 Second, in some 
jurisdictions, financial institutions are able to allow MERS to bring the 
foreclosure proceedings, thus preventing a bank from having to assume 
the responsibility of maintaining a foreclosure action.
103
 
Even with these incentives, it is important for legislatures and 
 
 95.  Id. 
 96.  Steven, supra note 4, at 256 (citing Beau Phillips, MERS: The Mortgage Electronic 
Registration System, 63 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 262, 264). 
 97.  Id. (the author is noting that “state laws take disparate views on MERS’s standing to 
foreclose,” especially after analyzing U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 54 (Mass. 
2011) and Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 770 N.W.2d 487, 494 (Minn. 2009)). 
 98.  Korngold, supra note 6, at 744. 
 99.  Id. at 746 (citing Gretchen Morgenson, Work Out Problems with Lenders? Try to Find 
Them, N.Y. TIMES, July 20, 2008, at A14). 
 100.  Id. at 744. 
 101.  Peterson, supra note 46, at 1362. 
 102.  Id. 
 103.  Id.; see also Christopher L. Peterson, Predatory Structured Finance, 38 CARDOZO L. 
REV. 2185, 2208-12 (2007). 
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courts to put an end to the carelessness and fraud that has littered the 
mortgage securitization system, a system blamed for causing the market 
collapse.
104
 Determining the rules and procedures for a more adequate, 
efficient, and fair foreclosure process is not an easy task. And, in 
correcting the system, it is important to remember that there are major 
economic consequences when corrective actions are taken; these 
changes must not put further strain on markets or their operations.
105
 
B. State Classifications 
States that institute strict foreclosure requirements and regulations 
afford the most protection to the homeowners and put the biggest burden 
on the financial institutions that bring the foreclosure actions. However, 
other states take a more lenient approach by having less stringent 
standards and requirements. 
1. Strict Standing Requirements 
One of the first factors to consider when determining a state’s 
classification is to look at the state’s standing requirements. 
The first state to consider when looking at the requirements for 
standing is Massachusetts. In a recent decision, the Supreme Judicial 
Court of Massachusetts held that, at the time a foreclosure action is 
commenced, the mortgage document must specifically identify the 
mortgage holder, essentially disallowing blank assignments of 
mortgages without direct proof of the assignment.
106
 Under this ruling, 
MERS is not permitted to bring a blank assignment of a mortgage in 
Massachusetts. Furthermore, the owner of a mortgage must clearly 
identify itself as the owner of the note prior to bringing a foreclosure 
complaint.
107
 
Another state to consider is New Jersey, where the Superior Court 
made a similar finding to Massachusetts. The court held that “MERS, as 
a nominee, does not have any real interest in the underlying debt, or the 
 
 104.  Korngold, supra note 6, at 739. 
 105.  Id. at 732. 
 106.  U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 53 (Mass. 2011); see also Steven, supra 
note 4, at 258 (explaining that “where a mortgage note is blank and does not list the owner of the 
mortgage, a foreclosure cannot proceed under Ibanez”). 
 107.  Steven, supra note 4, at 259 (citing MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. TIT. 3, § 244 (2011)). Other 
states to consider include Oregon and Idaho. See OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 86.752 (renumbered from 
86.735 in 2013 by the Legislative Council) (requiring recording of all transfers of the loan); IDAHO 
CODE ANN. §45-1505(1) (West, Westlaw through the 2014 Second Reg. Sess. of the 62nd Idaho 
Leg.) (requiring all assignments to be recorded in the counties where the property is located). 
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mortgage which secured that debt. It acts simply as an agent or ‘straw 
man’ for the lender.”108 Thus, without the proper interest, MERS lacks 
standing to bring the foreclosure complaint in New Jersey.
109
 If an 
institution attempting to bring a foreclosure complaint is not the original 
mortgagee on the mortgage document, it must prove the entire chain-of-
title, establishing how it came into interest of the note and mortgage, 
similar to Massachusetts.
110
 Lastly, New Jersey requires the party 
bringing the foreclosure action to have the actual note in its possession, 
while possession of the mortgage document is optional.
111
 
New York has taken a similar approach as New Jersey. New York 
requires the financial institutions to submit both the original note and 
evidence of assignments in order to establish that it has standing to bring 
the foreclosure action.
112
 
The Supreme Court of Arkansas has also held that MERS does not 
have any interest in the mortgages it services and, at the most, “[MERS 
is the] mere agent of the lender [it services].”113 Thus, MERS does not 
have standing in Arkansas to bring an action for foreclosure.
114
 
Ohio has established that a party attempting to bring a foreclosure 
complaint needs only the mortgage/security document or the original 
note; however, a party cannot acquire standing subsequent to filing the 
foreclosure by receiving the original note after the filing of the 
complaint.
115
 Thus, the party needs to ensure that it has standing prior to 
 
 108.  Bank of New York v. Raftogianis, 13 A.3d 435, 449 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 2010). 
 109.  Howard, supra note 22, § 4 (noting that “a party seeking to foreclose a mortgage must 
own or control the underlying debt”).  
 110.  Raftogianis, 13 A.3d at 452, 455 (noting rule 4:64-1(b)(10) and that dismissal is 
appropriate in cases where the Plaintiff is unable to establish standing to bring the foreclosure 
complaint). 
 111.  Id. at 455, 458.  
 112.  Howard, supra note 22, § 4 (where the authority conducted an analysis of New York laws 
analyzed in In re Mims, 438 B.R. 52 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2010) and 627 Acquisition Co., LLC v. 627 
Greenwich, LLC, 927 N.Y.S.2d 23 (N.Y. App. Div. 2011)). However, in Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. v. Coakley, the court allowed MERS to bring a foreclosure action as long 
as it held both the Note and the Mortgage at the time of commencement. Mortg. Elec. Registration 
Sys., Inc. v. Coakley, 838 N.Y.S.2d 622, 623-24 (N.Y. App. Div. 2007). Therefore, MERS has 
more leniency in New York. 
 113.  Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. v. Southwest Homes of Arkansas, 2009 Ark. 152, at 1-3, 
301 S.W.3d 1, 2-3 (using the reasoning that “no payments on the underlying debt were ever made to 
MERS. MERS did not service the loan in any way. It did not oversee payments, delinquency of 
payments, or administration of the loan in any way.”). 
 114.  Id. at 7-8, 301 S.W.3d at 5. 
 115.  Fed. Home Loan Mortg. Corp. v. Schwartzwald, 134 Ohio St. 3d 13, 2012-Ohio-5017, 
979 N.E.2d 1214, at ¶ 3 (this case was a landmark decision for Ohio in which the Supreme Court of 
Ohio determined whether a party could acquire standing subsequent to filing the foreclosure 
complaint). This new ruling in Ohio provides a more lenient approach than that decided in In re 
16
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bringing the action in Ohio.
116
 
Florida, like Ohio, only requires possession of the original note to 
have standing to bring a foreclosure action.
117
 Florida, however, does 
allow notes to be indorsed in blank, meaning no chain of title or 
assignment is needed.
118
 Furthermore, as in Ohio, the plaintiff in Florida 
must prove, at the time of filing the complaint, that it had standing to 
sue; meaning, lack of standing cannot be cured after the initial filing of 
the complaint.
119
 
2. Lenient Standing Requirements 
While some states take a strict stance by having more requirements 
for financial institutions, other states take the opposite approach. For 
example, Minnesota does not require assignments to be recorded; thus, 
MERS’ procedure of only recording assignments within its personal 
system is valid.
120
 Furthermore, Minnesota allows organizations such as 
MERS to enforce the note when bringing a foreclosure action, as long as 
it is acting as a nominee or agent.
121
 
Some states go as far as to allow MERS to always foreclose on 
mortgages. For example, in Nevada, MERS may foreclose on a 
residential property under the reasoning that the initial financial 
institution and MERS entered into an agency relationship whereby the 
institution gave MERS the most leeway in terms of its actions.
122
 
However, by Nevada requiring the presence of both documents, the 
homeowner will at least know the true identity of the party that has 
 
Foreclosure Cases. In re Foreclosure Cases, 521 F. Supp. 2d 650, 653 (S.D. Ohio 2007) (analyzing 
Ohio law and deciding that the party attempting to establish standing must have both the mortgage 
document and the note in its possession). 
 116.  Schwartzwald, 2012-Ohio-5017 at ¶ 3. 
 117.  U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Knight, 90 So. 3d 824, 826 (Fla Dist. Ct. App. 2012); see also 
McLean v. JP Morgan Chase Bank Nat’l Ass’n, 79 So. 3d 170, 172 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2012) 
(noting that if the “note does not name the plaintiff as the payee, the note must bear a special 
endorsement in favor of the plaintiff or a blank endorsement”). 
 118.  Knight, 90 So. 3d at 826. 
 119.  McLean, 79 So. 3d at 172; see also Progressive Express Ins. Co. v. McGrath Cmty. 
Chiropractic, 913 So. 2d 1281, 1285 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005). 
 120.  Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 770 N.W.2d 487, 489-90 (Minn. 2009) 
(holding that “transfers of the underlying indebtedness do not have to be recorded to foreclose a 
mortgage”). 
 121.  MINN. STAT. ANN. §507.413 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2014 Reg. Sess.). 
 122.  Smith v. Cmty. Lending, Inc., 773 F. Supp. 2d 941, 944 (D. Nev. 2011) (where the court 
used the reasoning that “[a]lthough MERS is not in fact the beneficiary, the attempt to name it as 
such coupled with the [language of the agreement] . . . indicates an intent to give MERS the 
broadest possible agency on behalf of the owner of the beneficial interest in the underlying debt”). 
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ownership of the debt, instead of it just listing “MERS.”123 
The state of Florida has some of the most relaxed laws when it 
comes to standing. Under Florida statutory provisions, any person or 
entity can enforce a note or mortgage instrument, even if it is not the 
owner of the instrument or does not have possession of the instrument, 
as long as it is allowed to enforce the document pursuant to other 
provisions.
124
 Furthermore, a party who is in wrongful possession of the 
instrument can still enforce it as long as the party has possession of the 
instrument.
125
 
Kansas is similar to Florida in terms of leniency. In order to 
respond to MERS specifically, Kansas developed a statute just dealing 
with nominees and the enforcement of security interests.
126
 The courts in 
Kansas have also started to interpret MERS standing arguments more 
favorably towards MERS. For instance, MERS is now able to bring a 
foreclosure action in Kansas against a property owner on behalf of the 
mortgagee for which they are an agent or nominee.
127
 However, in a 
subsequent decision, it was determined that the nominee could only 
bring a foreclosure action if it is indicated to the nominee from the 
mortgagee that it should be granted with this power, a partial limitation 
on the previous decision.
128
 
 
 123.  Peterson, supra note 46, at 1361-62. 
 124.  Steven, supra note 4, at 262. 
 125.  Steven, supra note 4, at 262-63 (analyzing §673.3011 of the Florida Code); see also 
Martins v. BAC Home Loans Servicing, L.P., 722 F.3d 249 (5th Cir. 2013) (analyzing Texas law 
and generally holding that MERS is not required to hold the note in order to foreclose). North 
Carolina even allows the financial institution to submit only a photo-copy of the original note; it 
never has to provide or prove actual possession of the original note that was filed. Courts have 
allowed these photo-copies without proof or establishment that they are replicas of the original. See 
Howard, supra note 22, § 5 (citing Dobson v. Substitute Tr. Servs., Inc., 711 S.E.2d 728 (N.C. Ct. 
App. 2011)) see also Gallant v. Deutsche Bank Nat’l Trust Co., 766 F. Supp. 2d 714, 721 (W.D. Va. 
2011) (applying Virginia law) (court generally noted that the mortgagee did not have to produce or 
insert into record the original note in order to be entitled to foreclose on a property). 
 126.  Steven, supra note 4, at 263 (noting KAN. STAT. ANN. § 60-219 (West 2011), which 
reads that “[i]n an action in which any relief is sought would determine title or affect a security 
interest in real property, a person who is subject to service of process must be joined as a party if the 
person is a nominee of record on behalf of a beneficial owner of a claimed interest in the property 
that is the subject of the action. The nominee need not be a party required to be joined under 
subsection (a)(1).”)). 
 127.  Martinez v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys. (In re Martinez), 444 B.R. 192, 204-05 
(Bankr. D. Kan. 2011). 
 128.  U.S. Bank, N.A. v. Howie, 280 P.3d 225, 226-27 (Kan. Ct. App. 2012) (the court noted 
that “[g]enerally, a mortgage is unenforceable when it is not held by the same entity that holds the 
promissory note. However, an exception exists where there is an agency relationship between the 
holder of the mortgage and the holder of the promissory note.”). Essentially, the note and the 
mortgage are not split if both the mortgagee and the mortgagee’s nominee hold them. 
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3. Judicial v. Non-Judicial Foreclosure Proceedings 
States can also be classified by the amount of judicial oversight the 
state requires in the foreclosure process. States that allow financial 
institutions to foreclose on a property with little judicial oversight are 
said to be “non-judicial foreclosure” states.129 Essentially, in a non-
judicial foreclosure state, the financial institutions exercise the power of 
sale that is included as a provision in the mortgage document without 
first consulting with the courts.
130
 States that allow non-judicial 
foreclosures possess a lenient classification. This is obviously in contrast 
to a “judicial foreclosure” state where the foreclosure is initiated by a 
complaint for foreclosure filed with the court, directly involving the 
court and its procedures.
131
 States mandating judicial foreclosures have a 
strict classification when it comes to the formal procedures of the 
foreclosure process. Currently, a little over half of the states use non-
judicial methods when conducting foreclosures, thus making them more 
common than one may perceive.
132
 
In states that operate a non-judicial foreclosure proceeding, the 
homeowner, in order to apply the strict standards of proof, files an 
injunction with the court in order to stop or delay the non-judicial 
foreclosure; the injunction must specify the legal claims and defenses 
argued by the homeowner.
133
 For classification purposes, these non-
judicial foreclosure states would be listed under the “lenient” category if 
it were not for these states’ strict standards of proof that the homeowner 
can invoke in order to stay the foreclosure sale. 
Minnesota is an ideal example of a state that allows non-judicial 
foreclosure sales.
134
 In Minnesota, a financial institution can foreclose on 
 
 129.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 111. 
 130.  Id. at 140 (citing John Rao & Geoff Walsh, Foreclosing a Dream: State Laws Deprive 
Homeowners of Basic Protections, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CENTER, Feb. 2009, at 11, available at 
http://www.nclc.org/images/pdf/foreclosure_mortgage/state_laws/foreclosing-dream-report.pdf). 
 131.  Id. at 139 (citing JOHN RAO et al., FORECLOSURES: DEFENSES, WORKOUTS AND 
MORTGAGE SERVICING § 4.2.3 at 105, § 4.2.4 at 106 (National Consumer Law Center 3d ed. 
2010)). Also, currently 22 states use judicial foreclosure proceedings: Connecticut, Delaware, 
Florida, Hawaii, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maine, New Jersey, New 
Mexico, New York, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, South Carolina, South Dakota, 
Vermont and Wisconsin. MORTGAGE BANKERS ASS’N, JUDICIAL VERSUS NON-JUDICIAL 
FORECLOSURE, available at 
http://www.mbaa.org/files/ResourceCenter/ForeclosureProcess/JudicialVersusNon-
JudicialForeclosure.pdf. 
 132.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 139. 
 133.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 141. 
 134.  Jackson v. Mortg. Elec. Registration Sys., 770 N.W.2d 487, 494 (Minn. 2009) (analyzing 
§ 580.02 and § 580.04 of the Minnesota Code). 
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any property as long as there is not a current action to recover on the 
note already established, all recording and assignment measures have 
been met, and the institution has complied with all notice requirements 
under §580.04 of the Minnesota Code.
135
 Furthermore, if an institution 
fails to comply with any of these requirements, the sale is void.
136
 
Some states, such as Massachusetts, place stricter standards on 
financial institutions when establishing standing prior to bringing a 
complaint for a foreclosure, but some states still allow for non-judicial 
foreclosure proceedings.
137
 Like Minnesota, Massachusetts also 
establishes that the mortgagor can stay the foreclosure proceeding by 
raising proper defenses and obtaining a declaration from the court.
138
 
However, the homeowner is still able to challenge the sale subsequent to 
the auction/sale by requesting that the proper title to the property be 
called into question.
139
 For example, where there is a lack of standing 
and proper title is found to be void, the sale is also voided.
140
 Obviously, 
many other states allow these non-judicial foreclosures; however, each 
state may differ on procedures and standards the financial institution 
must follow when initiating a foreclosure. 
4. ADR Requirements 
Another way of classifying a state’s foreclosure laws is to analyze 
any sort of alternative dispute resolution (ADR) techniques that the 
courts or statutes implement prior to the foreclosure sale. The use of 
ADR during the foreclosure process has the potential of saving more 
homes from going to sale and also benefits the financial institutions by 
allowing them to more easily recoup some of their losses. As millions of 
Americans continue to lose their homes to foreclosure, such alternatives 
may keep people in their homes.
141
 Furthermore, the use of ADR helps 
 
 135.  MINN. STAT. ANN. §§ 580.02, 580.04 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2014 Reg. 
Sess.). 
 136.  Jackson, 770 N.W.2d at 494; see also Moore v. Carlson, 128 N.W. 578, 579 (Minn. 
1910). 
 137.  U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 49 (Mass. 2011) (noting that there is a 
statutory power of sale for mortgage holders to foreclose without a judicial authorization). 
 138.  Id.; see also Beaton v. Land Ct., 326 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Mass. 1975). Interestingly, 
Massachusetts is also a foreclosure by entry state, where the mortgage holder may peaceably enter a 
property subsequent to a recording of a certificate noting the entry by foreclosure. See MASS. GEN. 
LAWS ANN. ch. 244, §§ 1-2 (2011). 
 139.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 148-49 (analyzing Novastar Mortg., Inc. v. Saffran, 948 N.E.2d 
917 (Mass. App. Ct. 2011)). 
 140.  Id. 
 141.  Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1889. 
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ensure that only the necessary foreclosure sales occur, which may, in 
result, help stabilize the economy once again.
142
 
The ADR process works by requiring the homeowners to sit down 
and discuss the mortgage and delinquent payments with the financial 
institutions.
143
 By requiring ADR, courts are essentially forcing the 
financial institutions to weigh and consider the benefits of a sale against 
the potential benefits of allowing the homeowner to remain in the home 
and make reduced payments.
144
 Such a process may be particularly 
helpful in areas with a poor housing market where it may be difficult to 
re-sell a home and recoup the amount on the note. 
Clear objectives for the ADR meetings are required in order to 
ensure success. In fact, one author has very clearly laid out five 
objectives that should be followed in the process. First, the ADR process 
should be used to facilitate more clear communication that may have 
otherwise been inhibited because of the confusion in the securitization 
process.
145
 Second, the ADR process should “provide oversight of the 
loan servicers’ conduct” by the courts.146 Third, the process should allow 
the courts to educate homeowners about their rights during the 
process.
147
 Fourth, it should allow the courts to better manage a docket 
littered with foreclosure complaints, especially in areas with judicial 
foreclosure proceedings.
148
 Fifth, the process allows the courts to 
manage the image of the community by allowing more homes to be 
occupied.
149
 
Oftentimes, however, in order for the ADR process to be 
successful, the foreclosure complaint must be stayed or removed from 
active docket because it is counter-intuitive to allow a financial 
institution to continue with a foreclosure while at the same time 
negotiating alternatives.
150
 Alternative resolutions may in fact help more 
homeowners stay in their homes, while still allowing the financial 
institutions to recoup some of their losses under the default. 
 
 142.  Id. at 1908. For an example of a statutory requirement for mediation, see Vermont’s 
statute regarding “Opportunity to Mediate.” VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, § 4632 (2013). 
 143.  Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1908. 
 144.  Id. 
 145.  Id. at 1909. 
 146.  Id. 
 147.  Id. 
 148.  Id. 
 149.  Id. 
 150.  Id. at 1924. 
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C. Some Courts Still Remain Undecided 
Some states have yet to set standards concerning some aspects of 
the foreclosure process; for example, standards on who may bring a 
foreclosure action or what requirements will be used for standing.
151
 
Therefore, it is crucial to outline the positives and negatives of every 
aspect of the process while guiding the undecided states, and all others, 
towards a more uniform system that treats the financial institutions and 
the homeowners with equality. 
The state of Michigan still remains uncertain, even after various 
court rulings. An intermediate court voided non-judicial foreclosures 
that were brought by MERS under the state law that requires the “owner 
of the indebtedness or of an interest in the indebtedness secured by the 
mortgage” to foreclose.152 However, subsequent to this decision, the 
Michigan Supreme Court ruled that record titleholders, such as MERS, 
were included under the part of the statute that states the “owner. . .of an 
interest in the indebtedness” may also foreclose on a property.153 This 
decision overruled a previous Michigan Supreme Court decision, which 
interpreted a person owning an interest in the note to mean a party 
receiving payments under the terms of the note.
154
 These two decisions 
came only seven months apart.
155
 
D. Negative Aspects of Various Rules and Regulations 
This comment now analyzes the pros and cons of the rules and 
regulations outlined above and then develops an ideal foreclosure 
process that embraces efficiency, reliability, and fairness. 
1. Judicial Foreclosure 
Even the judicial oversight procedures, some of the concepts 
discussed above, carry inefficiencies and unfairness towards a 
homeowner. For example, when a foreclosure goes through a formal 
judicial proceeding, the process may be slow and cumbersome.This may 
cause a negative impact on the communities, especially when 
 
 151.  See Natarelli & Golden, supra note 83, at 405. 
 152.  Id. at 403 (analyzing § 600.3204(1)(d) of the Michigan Code). 
 153.  Residential Funding Co., L.L.C. v. Saurman (Saurman II), 805 N.W.2d 183, 184 (Mich. 
2011). 
 154.  Residential Funding Co., LLC v. Saurman (Saurman I), 807 N.W.2d 412 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2011). 
 155.  Saurman II, 805 N.W.2d 183 (decided Nov. 16, 2011); Saurman I, 807 N.W.2d 412 
(decided Oct. 7, 2010). 
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foreclosures become back-logged and homes sit empty. If the process 
was performed in a more expedited and efficient manner, homes may fill 
more quickly, preventing community blight.
156
 Furthermore, judicial 
foreclosure proceedings are extremely inefficient economically, both for 
the homeowner and for the financial institution.
157
 
It is important, however, to weigh all of the negative aspects of a 
judicial foreclosure proceeding against the negative aspects of a non-
judicial foreclosure proceeding. 
2. Non-Judicial Foreclosure 
After analyzing some of the drawbacks of a judicial foreclosure 
proceeding, the non-judicial foreclosures may seem more efficient; 
however, such a procedure has just as many, if not more, drawbacks than 
the judicial proceeding.
158
 First, without the oversight of a decree by a 
judicial officer, titles to property sold improperly may have to be voided, 
causing great confusion for subsequent purchasers of the property; such 
a problem may also lead to increases in title insurance for homeowners, 
especially when purchasing foreclosed homes.
159
 
Second, non-judicial foreclosures tend to be more friendly to the 
lenders and financial institutions than to the homeowners. Essentially, 
the procedure is set in motion and completed very quickly and puts 
pressure on the homeowners to slow down or challenge the process.
160
 
 
 156.  See Renuart, supra note 5, at 174 (further discussing the possible national ramifications 
of delayed foreclosures in terms of the securitization process and the market activity as a whole). 
One particular article estimates that homeowners surrounding a vacant, foreclosed home will lose 
approximately $1,508 due to a decrease in their home value, while the local community 
governments will lose approximately $19,227 through a loss in taxes and fees, along with a 
shrinking tax base due to lower priced homes. Glenn Setzer, Foreclosures Cost Lenders, 
Homeowners, the Community Big Bucks, MORTGAGE NEWS DAILY (June 2, 2008, 7:00 AM), 
http://www.mortgagenewsdaily.com/622008_Foreclosure_Costs.asp. 
 157.  See Setzer, supra note 156 (noting that the average foreclosure costs financial institutions 
approximately $77,935; furthermore, the cost of preventing a foreclosure will cost the homeowner 
approximately $3,300). 
 158.  One state in particular, Hawaii, has noticed these drawbacks and has eliminated many 
uses of non-judicial foreclosure proceedings. See Everett S. Kaneshige & Seth J. Corpuz-Lahne, The 
New Foreclosure Law, 16 HAW. B. J. 4, 5 (2012). 
 159.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 174. Such a concept may also require states to adopt or change 
laws concerning subsequent bonafide purchasers. In one particular case, Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court voided a foreclosure sale to a subsequent purchaser, thus 
removing the homeowner from the home, and the homeowner could not acquire good title. 
Bevilacqua v. Rodriguez, 955 N.E.2d 884, 897 (Mass. 2011). For a more detailed article on the non-
judicial affects in Massachusetts, see McMorrow, supra note 12. 
 160.  Frank S. Alexander et al., Legislative Responses to the Foreclosure Crisis in Nonjudicial 
Foreclosure States, 31 REV. BANKING & FIN. L. 341, 344-45 (2011). 
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Such challenges require swift action by the homeowner, who may not 
even be aware of the options they have; furthermore, it places even more 
financial strain on the homeowner by requiring one to seek immediate 
legal counsel and advice, as opposed to working directly with a judge 
through a formal foreclosure proceeding.
161
 Swift action may eliminate 
options for non-foreclosure remedies, such as solutions through 
mediation. 
Third, the non-judicial proceeding may not be as friendly to the 
lender as some may first perceive. Pursuing an action through a non-
judicial proceeding may prevent the financial institutions from pursuing 
claims after the foreclosure sale, for example, by obtaining a declaration 
on a deficiency judgment.
162
 So while the efficiency and reduced cost of 
bringing a foreclosure under non-judicial proceedings seems lucrative at 
first, the popularity of such proceedings may be decreasing.
163
 
3. Securitization and MERS 
Some believe that courts are not keeping up with changing times, 
especially regarding the mortgage securitization process.
164
 These parties 
are quick to point out the ineffectiveness of requiring the party-in-
interest to bring a foreclosure complaint.
165
 These parties base their 
argument around a few concepts. First, the promissory note, or the right 
to enforce the promissory note, needs to transfer with the mortgage 
document because a transfer of a mortgage without the right to enforce 
the note is a nullity.
166
 Furthermore, some argue that the rule is pointless 
because the promissory note could simply be transferred on the eve of 
trial through a blank assignment.
167
 In instances where a financial 
institution issues a servicer, such as MERS, the servicer technically does 
not have an interest in the promissory note, i.e. it is not the real party-in-
interest; however, these financial institutions are granting the servicers 
 
 161.  Id. (providing a further explanation of ways non-judicial foreclosure states are attempting 
to reduce foreclosures, even with the relaxed procedure rules and regulations). 
 162.  Id. at 349. 
 163.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 179-80 (discussing how states are starting to re-examine non-
judicial foreclosures). 
 164.  See Korngold, supra note 6, at 727 (indicating the constant changes occurring among 
financial entities). 
 165.  See Natarelli & Golden, supra note 83, at 402-03 (discussing how there are no real 
problems when splitting the note). 
 166.  Id. at 402 (providing the reason Arizona and California will “allow for a party on both 
ends of the ‘split’ to foreclose”). 
 167.  Id. 
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the right to foreclose on behalf of the real party-in-interest.
168
 Also, 
while the banks have sufficient information concerning who has an 
interest in each mortgage and promissory note because of the rise of 
document records, local filing offices may not have updated records that 
establish who is the proper party-in-interest.
169
 In addition, such a rule 
prevents an efficient foreclosure process, and it requires more time and 
money to sort through the complicated transfers and assignments when 
the original intent was to give the nominee or representative agency the 
power to bring the foreclosure.
170
 
A possible consequence of failing to require parties to prove an 
interest or that it is the proper party to bring the foreclosure action is that 
people may obtain free homes without any obligation to pay the debt 
owed on the home.
171
 This is a result of rules such as Ohio’s two 
dismissal rule, where essentially if there are two dismissals (either with 
or without prejudice) the same claim cannot be re-filed a third time.
172
 
4. ADR 
While mediation does seem like an advantageous alternative to a 
foreclosure proceeding, it does have its drawbacks. First, it does not 
make sense to have a financial institution engaged in mediation talks 
while at the same time advocating for the foreclosure of the property, 
because the time and resources will still be spent on the ultimate 
solution: foreclosure.
173
 The constant re-submitting and upkeep of 
 
 168.  Foreclosure: Fifth Circuit Issues Important Wins for Lenders, 43 REAL EST. L. REP. 1, 2 
(Aug. 2013). The Fifth Circuit came to this conclusion after analyzing Martins v. BAC Home Loans 
Servicing, L.P., 722 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2013). 
 169.  Korngold, supra note 6, at 744. 
 170.  See Beau Phillips, MERS: The Mortgage Electronic Registration System, 63 CONSUMER 
FIN. L. Q. REP. 262, 273-74 (2009). 
 171.  See W.W. Allen, Annotation, What Dismissals Preclude a Further Suit, Under Federal 
and State Rules Regarding Two Dismissals, 65 A.L.R.2d 642, § 1 (1959) (discussing Ohio’s “two 
dismissal rule” found under Ohio Civ. R. 41(A)(1) and how it pertains to private foreclosure 
actions). 
 172.  Id.  
 173.  Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1924; see also Natarelli & Golden, supra note 83, at 405 
(noting that “[m]uch of the law regarding MERS, and foreclosure standing generally, is still unclear 
outside of major foreclosure states (e.g., Florida, Illinois, Indiana, Ohio)”); Peterson, supra note 46, 
at 1361 (noting that “virtually no academic attention has been paid to the one particular company 
that has been a party in more subprime mortgage loans than any other[,]” referring to MERS); John 
P. Hunt, Richard Stanton & Nancy Wallace, Rebalancing Public and Private In the Law of 
Mortgage Transfer, 62 AM. U.L. REV. 1529, 1533 (2013) (noting that “in many states it is unclear 
whether a mortgage buyer must record its interest in order to ensure that its ownership interest in the 
mortgage is protected from subsequent claimants”). The article also goes on to point out that in 
many states there can be a conflict between the requirements under real-property law and the state’s 
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financial packets and financial documents may put too much of a burden 
on the homeowner.
174
 Furthermore, mediation can delay what is only the 
inevitable: foreclosure of the property.
175
 Lastly, mediation programs 
may increase the attorney’s fees that the homeowner will ultimately have 
to pay to the financial institution upon completion of the procedure, 
whether that completion is by settlement through a loan modification or 
collection on the foreclosed property.
176
 
E. Positive Aspects of Various Rules and Regulations 
While some procedures, rules, and other aspects of state foreclosure 
proceedings put the homeowner at a great disadvantage, some actually 
create fairness and uniformity. This section analyzes some of the 
positive aspects of various laws and court rules. 
1. Non-Judicial Foreclosure 
First, concerning the use of non-judicial foreclosures, one may 
easily see why some jurisdictions utilize this procedure.
177
 The use of 
non-judicial foreclosure proceedings essentially provides a process that 
is “quicker, easier, and [a] less costly method to repossess a borrower’s 
home [compared to a judicial proceeding].”178 While foreclosure 
proceedings that require judicial decrees could ultimately take years to 
go through the court, non-judicial foreclosure proceedings can conclude 
in 20 to 120 days, depending on the jurisdiction and the statutory 
language governing the proceeding.
179
 Also, the use of non-judicial 
foreclosure proceedings allows for the use of “self-policing” complaints, 
whereby the foreclosing party must ensure that they are the proper 
holder and owner of the note and mortgage; failure to do so could result 
in the foreclosure being overturned, benefiting the homeowner.
180
 
 
version of Article 9. Id. at 1561. 
 174.  Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1924-25. 
 175.  Id. at 1925. 
 176.  Id. at 1919-20 (noting that even without attorneys, the mandating of ADR will still be 
beneficial to both parties). 
 177.  An example is the state of Massachusetts, where the Supreme Judicial Court has ruled on 
the admissibility of statutory foreclosures that do not require a judicial decree. U.S. Bank Nat’l 
Ass’n v. Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d 40, 49 (Mass. 2011). 
 178.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 171. 
 179.  Molly F. Jacobson-Greany, Setting Aside Nonjudicial Foreclosure Sales: Extending the 
Rule to Cover Both Intrinsic and Extrinsic Fraud or Unfairness, 23 EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 139, 
150-51 (2006). 
 180.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 173. Also, a homeowner who is able to establish that he or she 
has been wrongfully foreclosed upon may have a tort action against the foreclosing entity. See 
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Furthermore, some states allow non-judicial foreclosures with the 
reason that homeowners are still provided a remedy in the event that 
there are questions as to true ownership of the promissory note and 
mortgage. For example, one of the most common remedies is for a 
mortgagor to file an action with the court that enjoins the foreclosure and 
allows the process to become a judicial foreclosure, thus allowing the 
court to have oversight.
181
 
2. Securitization and MERS 
Second, there are positive aspects to allowing MERS to manage 
mortgage documents and bring foreclosure actions. MERS enables 
mortgagees to keep recordings, assignments, and history of transfers in 
one location, and this is especially convenient in instances where the 
loan or promissory note is sold and the mortgagee still retains the right 
to be a servicer of the mortgage; such situations create a nightmare when 
it comes to recording of interests, assignments, and transfers.
182
 This 
system saves the mortgage industry and the financial institutions 
millions of dollars each year that would be accrued through recording 
fees and other general processing fees.
183
 Furthermore, the system works 
because the mortgage on record with each county does not need to be 
changed to reflect each subsequent assignment and transfer; MERS 
remains as the mortgagee on record with the county.
184
 Furthermore, 
MERS is able to help reduce mortgage fraud by cross-referencing 
information, which eliminates multiple loans being issued for the same 
property.
185
 
Many states still require the real party-in-interest to bring a 
foreclosure complaint.
186
 Such a requirement can provide major 
advantages to both the courts and the homeowners. First, such a rule 
insures that the money owed is going directly to the party entitled to 
 
James L. Buchwalter, Cause of Action in Tort for Wrongful Foreclosure of Residential Mortgage, 
52 CAUSES ACTION 2d 119, §1 (2012). 
 181.  See Ibanez, 941 N.E.2d at 49 (analyzing Beaton v. Land Ct., 326 N.E.2d 302, 307 (Mass. 
1975)). 
 182.  Phillips, supra note 170, at 263. 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  Id. For a further explanation concerning the ease with which MERS is able to record 
documents, see Alvin C. Harrell, Teaching Consumer Law: Part Four, 12 J. CONSUMER & COM. L. 
8 (2008). 
 185.  Phillips, supra note 170, at 264. For more information concerning mortgage fraud as a 
growing problem in America, see Therese G. Franzén, Update on Mortgage Fraud—What is 
Happening Today?, 62 CONSUMER FIN. L.Q. REP. 14 (2008). 
 186.  See supra Part III.A.1. 
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receive the money owed, e.g. the owner of the debt/obligation.
187
 Such a 
requirement also prevents two parties from laying claim to the debt or 
obligation, an issue that is easily foreseen due to the constant barrage of 
trading, buying, and selling of mortgages and promissory notes.
188
 
Lastly, by requiring the real party-in-interest to bring the action, courts 
are essentially requiring financial institutions to prove the true title or 
chain of assignment, ensuring all parties are properly represented.
189
 
Such a rule also requires transparency among all of the financial 
institutions, which encourages them to keep proper records and transfer 
the actual documents.
190
 Another reason for this requirement is that it 
helps establish a uniform system for all financial institutions to follow, 
which is extremely convenient given the current state of confusion 
surrounding whether nominees are able to bring foreclosure actions.
191
 
Also, by having such a requirement, courts are not shielding the 
financial institutions from liability for tortious actions such as predatory 
loan practices.
192
 
3. ADR 
Mediation can also be a great tool for courts to utilize; even states 
utilizing non-judicial foreclosures may still be able to enforce some sort 
of mediation requirement. Essentially, mediation brings both parties to 
the table and establishes communication between the borrowers and the 
financial institutions.
193
 Such communication allows for the two parties 
to consider whether foreclosure is the best route for the homeowner; for 
example, there may be instances where the homeowner is re-employed 
and the bank is able to obtain some sort of payment and keep the 
homeowner in the home.
194
 It is also during this time that the 
 
 187.  Howard, supra note 22, § 2. However, the constant struggle comes in when courts are 
trying to balance the benefits and popularity of the securitization market, while at the same time, 
trying to maintain the formality that should be required when determining if someone should be 
removed from their homes due to a mortgage default. See Davidson, supra note 1, at 394. 
 188.  Theoretically, if courts did not have this rule then “there would be a possibility that after 
a foreclosure the true owner of the loan could come forward rightfully seeking foreclosure on its 
interest and subject the homeowner to [a double jeopardy concept] . . . making the homeowner pay 
twice.” Timothy A. Froehle, Note, Standing in the Wake of the Foreclosure Crisis: Why Procedural 
Requirements are Necessary to Prevent Further Loss to Homeowners, 96 IOWA L. REV. 1719, 1731 
(2011). 
 189.  Id. at 1734. 
 190.  Korngold, supra note 6, at 746. 
 191.  See Davidson, supra note 1, at 408-09. 
 192.  See Phillips, supra note 170, at 264. 
 193.  Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1901. 
 194.  Id. at 1908. 
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homeowners, courts, and even the institutions themselves can discover if 
the party bringing the foreclosure action truly has standing, thus saving 
time down the litigation road.
195
 ADR also encourages settlement, thus 
reducing court docket overload in the hardest hit areas.
196
 Lastly, 
community blight and economic stress would decrease because the 
system would keep more people in their homes through the use of loan 
modifications and other settlement resolutions.
197
 
F. What Does the Ideal System Look Like? 
After a thorough analysis of the foreclosure process; the way 
different aspects of the system, such as large nominee firms like MERS, 
have changed the system; and advantages and disadvantages of various 
rules and regulations of the foreclosure process, this comment now 
provides a concept of what the ideal foreclosure process would look like 
within a uniform system. 
It has been said that “[l]aw is not endogenous; it grows in response 
to the pressures exerted upon it and, as Justice Holmes argued, is shaped 
less by any inherent logic and more by the accretion of experience.”198 
After five to six years of a continuous mortgage crisis, should we return 
to a more formalistic foreclosure proceeding?
199
 In some regards, this 
comment advocates for the foreclosure system to return to a more formal 
system. 
1. Formal Judicial Foreclosure System 
First, the foreclosure system needs to return to formal judicial 
proceedings by eliminating the use of non-judicial foreclosures. The 
judicial system provides the most fairness to both parties. Financial 
institutions under the judicial system can avoid post-resolution issues 
and  ensure any judgments or money owed by the homeowner can still 
be collected post-foreclosure.
200
 As noted above, there is uncertainty in 
some jurisdictions as to whether financial institutions can collect on 
loans that were foreclosed under non-judicial foreclosures.
201
 
Furthermore, a foreclosure conducted under a judicial proceeding will 
 
 195.  Id. at 1910. 
 196.  Id. at 1912. 
 197.  Id. at 1913. 
 198.  Davidson, supra note 1, at 430. 
 199.  Id. (discussing the possibility of returning to a more formalistic approach). 
 200.  See Renuart, supra note 5, at 139-40 (discussing the protection of lenders’ rights). 
 201.  See Kaneshige, supra note 158, at 5. 
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ensure the proper party is bringing the foreclosure complaint, by 
allowing the establishment of chain of titles and assignments.
202
 When a 
bank conducts a foreclosure under the safeguards and supervision of the 
courts, this is more likely to prevent the financial institution from having 
to return the home to the homeowner, post-foreclosure, as a result of 
improper assignments/chain-of-titles or some other defect that may 
result as a consequence of a non-judicial foreclosure.
203
 
Judicial foreclosure proceedings are obviously more fair to 
homeowners than non-judicial proceedings. Such a formal proceeding, 
which moves slower than non-judicial foreclosures, provides the 
homeowner with adequate time to seek legal assistance, even if from 
free or reduced-fee services such as legal aid.
204
 This enables the 
homeowner to fully investigate the foreclosure and documents to ensure 
no defenses apply, such as fraud or chain-of-title issues that may arise 
during a proceeding. Furthermore, by slowing the process down, the 
system gives the homeowner a chance to obtain new or better 
employment and a chance to negotiate for a possible settlement, possibly 
resulting in the homeowner staying in the home and continuing to make 
payments.
205
 
Lastly, formal judicial proceedings are also beneficial to the local 
communities. Formal proceedings allow people to remain in their homes 
during the process, thereby reducing blight.
206
 If local judicial systems 
are concerned about overloaded court dockets, these jurisdictions can 
establish court rules limiting the amount of time a single foreclosure is 
able to sit on the active docket: for example, one year. 
2. Less Formal Standing Requirements 
Second, while this comment has advocated for more formal 
foreclosure proceedings, it also advocates for less-formal requirements 
concerning real party-in-interest criteria. While recognizing the concerns 
over the real party-in-interest, the courts will be able to ensure proper 
party participation if conducted under a formal judicial proceeding.
207
 
Such relaxed standards are necessary given the nature of today’s 
 
 202.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 139-40 (stating that lenders must show title). 
 203.  See Korngold, supra note 6, at 742-43 (discussing the courts’ attempts to determine 
chain-of-title). 
 204.  Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1938-41; Renuart, supra note 5, at 173-74 (discussing the 
problems associated with inadequate procedures). 
 205.  Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1953 (discussing the ability to modify loans). 
 206.  Id. at 1909. 
 207.  Renuart, supra note 5, at 173-74. 
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securitization process and the consistent use of mortgage servicers. In 
many cases, as seen above, the real party-in-interest has intended for 
these nominees and servicers to bring foreclosure complaints, so courts 
should allow them to bring the case.
208
 
Certain procedures can be applied and required in order to 
safeguard the relaxed party requirements. For example, jurisdictions 
should require all assignments to be filled in, thus eliminating the use of 
blank assignments.
209
 This will help establish and document the clear 
chain of title. Furthermore, jurisdictions should require the physical 
transfer of the original mortgage documents, including both the 
promissory note and the mortgage document.
210
 Possession of these 
documents will further prove that a party has an interest in the 
promissory note or is at least the servicer or nominee of the mortgage 
documents. This will also provide incentives for financial institutions 
and their nominees/servicers to keep both the promissory note and 
mortgage together, rather than split them up between different parties.
211
 
However, the issue concerning whether a nominee should bring a 
complaint is becoming less relevant because MERS no longer allows 
parties to bring a complaint in its name, nor will MERS itself bring a 
foreclosure complaint.
212
 
However, this comment does advocate that courts should continue 
to enforce rules such as the two-dismissal rule, whereby if a complaint is 
dismissed twice, whether with prejudice or without prejudice, the 
plaintiff is unable to bring the complaint a third time.
213
 Such rules 
equate to efficiency where the financial institutions will be forced to act 
more diligently in ensuring they can prove their case. Furthermore, this 
rule also encourages the banks to enter into settlement agreements that 
will actually work for the homeowners, because if the settlement 
agreement fails, it counts as one of the dismissals if it decides to re-file 
the complaint.
214
 
 
 208.  Phillips, supra note 170, at 263-64. 
 209.  Id. at 262-63 (showing how only MERS keeps the record of transfers). 
 210.  Steven, supra note 4, at 254; see also Phillips, supra note 170, at 263 (stating that 
physical transfer helps to keep the documents from becoming separated). 
 211.  Steven, supra note 4, at 254. 
 212.  See MERS to Members: Don’t Foreclose in Our Name, HOUSINGWIRE (Feb. 17, 2011, 
1:05 AM), http://www.housingwire.com/articles/mers-members-don%E2%80%99t-foreclose-our-
name. 
 213.  See U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n v. Gullotta, 120 Ohio St. 3d 399, 2008-Ohio-6268, 899 
N.E.2d 987, at ¶¶ 24-25. 
 214.  See id. at ¶¶ 14-15 
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3. Mandatory ADR 
Third, and finally, this comment advocates for the mandatory use of 
mediation or other similar ADR techniques. The use of mediation is 
beneficial to all parties in an action for foreclosure. The banks benefit 
for a few reasons. First, it allows them time to gather all necessary 
documents to move forward with the case, in the event of trial, such as 
obtaining the original mortgage and promissory note documents and 
completing or establishing the proper chain of title for each document.
215
 
Second, through a workout program with the homeowner, the financial 
institution can prevent a loss suffered on a home, especially in a 
declining population area, because the banks can at least receive some 
sort of payment on the loan.
216
 
Mediation programs are also very beneficial to homeowners for a 
few different reasons, especially when the courts direct homeowners 
towards free or reduced-fee legal services. First, the settlements usually 
allow a homeowner to keep their home and make some sort of monthly 
payment, usually less than the original principal amount.
217
 Such an 
agreement is particularly useful for homeowners that went through a 
brief stint of unemployment. However, in order for any sort of mediation 
program to be effective, the foreclosure action needs to be removed from 
the active docket to ensure the bank has a continued incentive to work 
with the homeowner.
218
 Mediation can also be very useful for 
communities because, once again, homeowners will be kept in their 
homes during the mediation process, thus preventing abandoned homes 
from being scattered around the community.
219
 
After reviewing the advantages and disadvantages of various 
jurisdictions and their rules and regulations, one can easily see that 
certain procedural techniques should be favored over others. This 
suggested process is the most fair, efficient, and effective procedure to 
conduct a foreclosure procedure. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
It is no secret that the financial collapse of recent years has put this 
country into a poor economic environment. Unfortunately, this 
environment has helped lead to a major mortgage problem in this 
 
 215.  Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1941-42 (discussing the discovery of documents). 
 216.  Id. at 1894. 
 217.  Id. at 1895. 
 218.  Id. at 1924. 
 219.  Id. at 1909. 
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country whereby many Americans are unable to make payments, thus 
going into foreclosure.
220
 Given an analysis of many jurisdictions and 
the confusion among rulings, many judicial districts were unprepared 
and blind-sided by such a problem—a problem of massive amounts of 
foreclosures.
221
 
The entire fix of the economic market may very well depend on 
how the rules of mortgages and foreclosures change and transform.
222
 
Therefore, as courts and legislatures continue to fix the system and 
create new laws to prevent future and further fallout from occurring, it is 
up to legal scholars to determine the best possible routes for turning this 
archaic security law into a more modern system.
223
 The debate and study 
of the various possible routes, both with the securitization process and 
the foreclosure process, could very well determine the future success of 
the economy around the world. 
 
 
 220.  Davidson, supra note 1, at 391. 
 221.  Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 1906. 
 222.  See Kurt Eggert, Not Dead Yet: The Surprising Survival of Negotiability, 66 ARK. L. REV. 
145, 147-68 (2013) (discussing how the failure to fix the securitization market now creates a 
substantial risk for the parties that enter into the securitization loan market). 
 223.  Hunt, supra note 173, at 1530. 
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